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IN THE SUPREME COURT'

OF THE STATE OF u·TAH

PO!{('~ ~~ 1 1 ~ 1•: RES. ERYO IR l'O ;\[~ )
I .:\7\ 't . a corporation,
Plaintiff and Rrsponrlfnf,
vs.

LLOYD\\'. KELLER CORPOH1\T I ():\'".a corporation~ A YON LA~D
. \ 7\ D L I \"ESTOCI\: CO ~1 PAN y,

i

Case N

I

n~HH

°·

a corporation~ H. A. SUM~lERS,·)

anrl C L E L L 1\ S U ~l~IERS, his
wife: II. A. S l T~I~IERS, JR., and
~IHS. ll. ... \ .. SF)I~IERS .TR .. his
wife,
IJrfcndants and Appellants. J

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

This is an action in eminent dmnain, the defendants
representing three different interests and all three inlrrr~ts were tried sin1ultaneously before the court and
.iury at one sitting.

1
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DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
'fhe three cases were tried before a jury. There
were three special verdicts rendered by the jury. Each
Yerdict was composed of two parts: ( 1) the value of
the land taken and, ( 2) severance damages. On two
of these verdicts the severance damages awarded were
less than the amounts testified to by any witness. The
defendants moved for a new trial. The court, on motion
of the plaintiff, by the theory of additur, attempted to
add sufficient monies to the severance damage in each
of the two cases so as to bring the severance damage
to the 1ninimum testimony of any witness at said hear
ing, the result being that the judgment entered in the
one case was based upon the jury's verdict, but, the
amended judgment entered in the other two cases was
based upon the court's verdict.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek an order from this court vacating
the judgments in all three cases and directing that a
new trial be granted.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Porcupine Reservoir Company, a corporation,
being a private corporation of the state of Utah, sought
2
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to condemn certain lands belonging to the defendants
in Cache County. A fee simple title was sought in and
to the reserYoir area and an easement was sought where
tht· di,·crting works would be situated. The defendants,
through their counsel, requested separate trials and
. . aid request was denied by the court. The jury ·was
impanelled to hear all three cases simultaneously. The
property owners and two expert witnesses, Thomas
Baum and I Iaven Barlow, testified as to Yalue and
damages for the defendants. Two witnesses, Alden
Adams and ~Iarcrllus Palmer, testified as to da1nages
and value for the plaintiff. The testimony of all wittlr~ses as to Yalue and damages, by stipulation of counsrl. was reduced to exhibits and received in evidence.
The eases took five ( 5) days to try with exhibits numbering one (I) to sixty-three ( 63) inclusive being offered. The jury retired for its deliberations and in less
than two hours returned its verdict, but, in two of the
three cases, brought in a verdict on severance da1nages
for less than that testified to by any witness.

ARGUlVIENT
POINT I.
TH.AT THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFEXDAXTS' REQUEST FOR SEPARATE
TRIALS.
The record is silent as to the official request made
that separate trials be granted but on (R. 236) we

3
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have the decision of the court In regard to the same,
which is:
''The court: It would be the same thing as to
Keller. We're trying them all together now.
No such thing as separate lawsuits. \Ve simply
haven't got the time to try them separately."
~Ir.

This is the answer given by the court to defendants'
request, which evidently was made off the record, that
defendants have the matters tried separately. The court,
as you see~ absolutely foreclosed the defendants from
separate trials. When the court did so, this situation
resulted: There were three separate parties with their
separate interests in this lawsuit, with problems arising
in different directions; a jury of lay people are brought
in who are forced off from their jobs and in some cases
are resentful, and then attempt to feed into them the
separate problems of each of the defendants, who are
having their property taken away from them against
their will; you atten1pt to explain and picture to them,
the damages that will accrue to each of the defendants,
put on an expert witness who talks about one case for
a few minutes, changes over and talks about another
and then changes over and talks about the third and
then you come back and cross examine him on each
of these cases on which he has given testimony. It be·
con1es mentally impossible for the jury to grasp, separate and comprehend the various problems presented
to them. You couple the foregoing with the objections
that counsel from both sides make from time to time,
the rulings either for or against the objections made.

4
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Tlwn nrld to that the problen1 of the total anwunt of
mom·y and dam anTs. This a 1l becomes cuinulatiYe and
•
M
-.tnggering in the minds of the jury. The rights of each
imliritlunl are lost track of and in their place is the
rumulatin· figure which the jury instinctively holds
:1~:till'il each inrlividual.

Then you add and create another proble1n in this:
Th<' Kclkrs' ~·car :tnmud operation is extensiYe and

must he shown and explained to the .i ury. It is natural
t'or the jury to helieY<· that the 1\:ellers are extren1ely
well-to-<lo berat1sc of their vast holdings. Defendants
str<llt.~·l~· feel in this case that the jury made up their
minds to sec that the mnount awarded to the l{ellers
'ras held to a minimum, and in their desire to carry this
out they even lowered it below the Ininimum.
l ask this question: llow n1uch of that den1onstrated
resentment. when three cases <He being tried before the
,iury, might be carried over mio the other cases? Then
you are also faced with this: If you have an indifferent
jury you are stuck with the1n for all three cases. The
jury certainly proved its indifference when, with sixtythree ( 63) exhibits and five ( 5) days of testimony, it
could sit down and determine the rights of three different litigants in less than two (:?) hours. The onh~
rlefrndnnt who was awarded n1ore seYerance dan1ag~s
than the minimun1 testimony was a widow lady and
her snn: the other two defendants were completely
disregarded. It is the contention of the defendants
thnt to force three defendants into one trial in an eminent

5
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dmnain proceeding because the court adopts the attitude, "we simply haven't got the time to try them sepa·
rately" is a far cry from justice. Defendants submit
that to try three lawsuits of this nature simultaneously
is not equitable, is not fair and is unjudicious. The
defendants further contend that to be forced to try
their cases in this manner is an abuse of discretion by
the trial court.

POINT II
THAT THE COURT ERRED "\VHEN IT
DENIED DEFENDANTS' ~-lOTION FOR A
NE\V TRI~~; .BASE~~A_P~QlJ~tv
D.t\.MAGE~ ARDEDJ\ IN T'VOo'FTHE
THREE CASES -w-HICH WERE TRIED SIl\IULTANEOUSLY, \VERE LESS THAN THE
TESTI~ION1:- OF 1\.NY 'VITNESS.
\Ve have tabulated below the testimony of each
and every witness, insofar as the value of the land taken,
severance damage and total, and have listed the jury
verdict under each of the titles of the defendants so
that the court can see at a glance the result of the five
( 5) days' testimony and the jury verdict, and it is as
follows:

6
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I kr<'tHbJII

Keller Corporation

Land Taken
I",,#~

(}\\lllT·s

(dcf)
1:.\ # ;;,-,;,

lcslimon\·
*1 t.,t)l().oo

Severance

Total

$18.000.00

$32,670.00

8,250.00

20,150.00

~0.00

21,1·34.00

3,884.20

6,080.00

"~,85;").25

7.115.00
6,863.00

II a \Ttl Barlow

(dcf)
11.DOO.OO
1:., :: :~H -Thomas Baun1
(dd')
]],]!lt.()O
1•:, #~::a. 1.:~1, .\lden ,\dams
(pi)
:!.1~l.).00
1•: \ # :,i ~ Ia n:cllus Pahner
( pl)
:.?.:!R7 ..~.o
1\n· .. Jury \' crd iet

a.fl(i0.00

I 0.:!

:).;!00.00

l)Pfenda n t--Sun1n1ers

K, ,: :HI. :to;,, ::ol,

0" iHTS tcstin1ony

( def)

*H.:n2.00 $15,712.00
F.\ :::lli. :Ilia. ;)tih --HaYen Barlow
( def)
9.1~7".00
11,130.00

J.:,

#;17 - Thmnas Baun1

( det')
7.706.00
Ex tttk1. ~~h -,\ldPit ~\darns
(pl)
1,641.10
F. x :t :,~l -:Jlarcellus Pahner
( pl)
1.:226.10
Ht'(' . .Tnry Yenlict
2.879.00

$25,084.00
20,317.00

14,884.00

22,317.00

5,18J..OO

6,825.00

2,009.00
.5,680.00

3,235.00
8,559.00

l)efendant-- .:\Yon Land and LiYestock Company
Ex ~=l-t, :: Ia. 34b-HaYen Barlow
(def)
$6,81 '~.00
$1.732.00

E' =:;q -Thomas Bamn
( def)
6,450.00
F." # t:!a, ~:?h -.Alden Adams

$8,5J6.00

3,128.00

~.758.00

( pl)

2 .-t:~f).40

2000.34

~,450.00

( pl)

1.550.90
a,6i8.00

1,732.66
1,57 ~.00

3,285.00

F. x # .-,~ -' rarcellus Palmer
J\q· . .T ury Yerdict

7
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The court will notice that in the tabulation of the
Keller Corporation, the jury verdict for severance damages was $3,200.00. The minimun1 severance damage
testified to by any witness was that of Alden Adams,
a witness for the plaintiff of $3,884.20.
In the Avon Land and Livestock Company tabulation the jury verdict for severance was $1,574<.00.
The minimum testimony of two people was that of
~1arcellus Palmer for $1,732.66 and Haven Barlow
for $1,732.00. Mr. Adams in this case, however, testified $2,000.34, yet he was the witness in the Keller
case that was low, l\ir. Palmer, in the Keller case, being
nearly $1,000.00 higher.
The defendants believe that when the jury returned a verdict contrary to the evidence and lower than
the testimony of any witness, it was shown on the face
of it that there was error in the form of influence of
passion or prejudice, or of refusal of the jury to follow
the court's instructions. In any event there was no evidence which would justify the verdict. The defendants
assert, as a matter if right under such verdict, it was
the court's duty to grant a new trial in all three cases.
Defendants further believe that a new trial should
be gran ted in all three cases for the reason that if the
jury demonstrated in two cases, either passion or prejudice, or refusal to follow the instructions of the court
that this is prima facie evidence that the same disregard
of the rights of the defendants, in some degree, was
carried into the other case. Inasmuch as the law, in re-

8
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gnrcl to Po in I II, and the cases which will be cited in
l'~~inl Ill, will be applieable to both points, counsel
feels it would he wis<' to list Point III and giYe the cases
und lt':xt. then \\T will have n1utual application.

POIXT III
TII.\T TI-lE COCHT EHRED \YIIEX IT

.\I>OPTED PL.\l~TIFF'S THEORY OF ADI>l'l'rH. S.\ID ERROR BEING AS FOLLO,VS:
(a) Tl L\.T I X 1\ ST.ATFTOR\r

CONDE~l

\ .\TIOX PHOCEEDTXGS, THE TAI\:ING OF
llEFI·~XI>.\XT'S PROPERTY IS PROTECTED
BY THE l'OXSTITl TTION AND STATUTES
\\'HICI-1 ~ICST BE STRICTLY CO~IPLIED
\\"ITH.
(b) TIL\T THERE IS NO STATUTORY

PROYISIOX FOR ADDITlJR IX CONDE)lX .\TIOX PROCEEDINGS.
(e) TilE COl 'HT lTSl"'RPED THE DEFEXDi\XTs·
COXSTITUTIOXAL
A X D

ST.\Tl-TOR\. . TRIAL BY Jl~RY AND Sl~B
STITlTTED A XE\Y. '""ERDICT BY THE
l'OlTRT \YITII THE AID, COXSEXT AND
HE(~l- EST OF THE PL.AIXTIFF OXL Y.
The Statutes invoh-ed are as follows: Article 1
'
Section :.?:.! of the Constitution of the State of Utah
reads:

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

uS ec. 22. Priz'ate property for public usc: PriYate property shall not be taken or dmnaged for
public use without just cmnpensation."
Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads:

uSee. 78-34-10, Compensation and dantaye8I-l ow as.Ye.'~sed.-The court, jury or referee must
hear such legal eYidence as may be offered by
any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
( 1) The value of the property sought to be
condetnned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and eYery separate estate or interest therein; and if it consists
of different parcels, the value of each parcel and
of each estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed.
( 2) If the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the
damages which will accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance fron1 the portion sought to be condemned
and the construction of the improvement in the
1uanner proposed by the plaintiff.
(3) --------------------------------

( 4) ··-·---------------------------( 5) As far as practicable cmnpensation must
be assessed for each source of dan1ages separately."
.A.rticle 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah reads
as follows:

uSee. 10, Trial hN jur,71: In capital cases the
right. of trial by jury shall retnain inYiolate. In

10
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{·marts ol' h"TtH·ral •J·urisdiction, except. in capital
I
cases. a j 11 n· ... hall consist of eight .Jurors.
n
courts or'inf~·rior jurisdiction a jury shall consist
of four j ur<H·s. In critninal cases the Yenl ict shall
he unat;imnlts. in civil cases three-fourth of the
j 11 rors nw ,. find a verdict. j \ .i ury in eivil cases
~hall he w~1in:d unless dnuat11lcd."

In the case hct'otT the court a denwnd for a jury 'vas
made and the jury l'cc paid, and as a consequence the
defendants were entitled to their trial by jury. Rule
::s of the Ftah Hules of ('i,·il Procedure reads:
"(a) Hi:tlti Prcsl'I"'Ccd. The right of trial by
,iury as declared hy the Constitution or as given
by statute shalllw preserYcd to the parties."
Hule :l~l of the ( · tah Rules of Civil Procedure reads:

.1!!

" (a) JJy Jury. \Yhen trial by jury has been
demawled as pnnrided in Hule 38, the action shall
he dcsigna ted upon the register of actions as a
jury action .... "
l'ounsel has searched in Yain, but there is no statute

providing for additur by the court to the jury verdict.
\\' e do have the constitutional provision that private
property shall not be taken, however, without just
compensation. \\' e do have the provision that we haYe
a right to trial by jury. \Ve do have a rule that says a
jury trial shall be preserved. En1inent domain proceedi11g~. such as we have in the case before the court are
st ridly statutory in nature and do not exist as a common law action. That is to say. without a statutory enactment there would be no such action as eminent
domain. Consequently, we haYe this query: If the jury's

11
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verdict is less than the testimony of any witness, and the
court so recognizes it, has the court the right in the
State of Utah to say, the jury made a mistake in its
verdict, but I have the right to substitute my theory of
additur? Does the court, by such a theory, take away
the defendants' right to trial by jury? Can it say,
whether you like it or not, you'll now have a trial by
the court? There is no case in the State of Utah exactly
in point, certainly not the case of Boden vs. Suhrmann,
327 P2d 826, which involved a common law action and
not a proceeding in e1ninent domain. There are, how·
ever~ a great number of cases in other states, which .do
have application. First, I want to quote from Nichols
on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Vol. 5, page 101:
"Where, however, the amount of the award is
not supported by any evidence and is, in fact,
contrary to the evidence adduced at the trial, the
appellate court may set aside the award even
though the a ward is based in part on a view of
the pren1ises by the triers of the facts.'.' (See nu·
merous cases cited) .
Continuing on page 104 of the same volume, we have:
" ... If outside the range of the testimony
such a wards have generally been set aside." See
nun1erous cases cited) .
Further quoting from page 107 under the title, "In·
crease or reduction of award," we have the following:
" ... Generally, however, in the absence of ex·
press statntor.lJ authority the trial court is with·
out power to increa.~e or di1ninish the amount of
tltc 'lcard as determined by the Jury or by com·

12
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In conden1nation proceedings the
trial judge has not th~ power of control over tJle
procec(lings ancl Ycnhcts possessed by the trial
judge in comtnon~law actions. He may, of cou~se,
('ontirm or set aside the award reported to him,
hut he cannot give binding instructions, and the
jury is the judge of both law and facts. ender
our eonsl:itutional provisions if the judge reaches
the conclusion that the award is excessive, he may
not hitnself reduce the a·ward and as so reduced
eonfirn1 it. Under such circumstances he should
refuse to confirn1, and order a new trial. It is the
constitutional right of an owner in most jurisdictions nut only to receive just compensation
for the property taken from him, _but also to
htn·e the atnount of that cmnpensation awarded
to hitn by a jury. If the court changes the amount
of the verdict in the absence and without the
consent of the jur~·, or the parties, there is a new
verdict rendered, not by a jury, but by a court
acting without a jury. This is violative of the
riyht.~ of the o·wncr becaztse, in the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, which takes the
property nf an o'lcner from him without his consent. the limitations prescribed by the constitution should be strictly observed, and the statutes
pw~.'ierl in p u rs ua nee thereof sho1tld be strictly
complied 1.cith. The fact that the verdict does not
co!lform to tl~e evidence, 01: is rendered through
n1~stake and 1~1adver~ence, Is. a cause for setting
a:\tde the verdict, or, If not discovered until after
judgn1ent is entered, is a cause for setting aside
both the verdict and judgment, but it does not
gin' the court power to correct the verdict. The
Yerdict is the jury's not the court's, and the power
of th.e court in such case~ is limited to seeing that
the Jurr return a verdict correct in form and
11/l.'i.'i/OfltTs.
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substance. It may not, after the verdict has been
returned and the jury discharged, change it, over
the objections of either of the parties, in, matters
of substance." (See the great number of cases
cited.) (Italics ours) .
Quoting again on page 110 of the same volun1e under
the heading "Inadequacy or Excessiveness of Award,"
we have:
"As heretofore pointed out, where the report
of the commissioners or the verdict of the jury
is either inadequate or excessive, although the
court is generally without power to modify the
report or verdict, it may set such report or verdict aside." (See nwnerous cases cited) .
In the case of City of Grand Rapids vs. Coit, 113 N\V
362, this is an action in Eminent Domain for the condemnation of certain land for a street. It is a case
exactly in point, for the jury brought in a verdict for
less than the testimony of any witness, and the court
applied the theory of additur to bring the verdict within
the testimony, and refused to grant a new trial. The
appellate court, in reversing the lower said, said on
page 363, righthand column:
" . . . The lowest value placed by a witness
upon the land known as Parcel #I was $335.00;
the highest $1,195.30. The compensation awarded by the jury was $304.15. See Grand Rapi~s
vs. Perkins, 78 ~Iichigan 93, 43 N\V 1037. This
award the petitioner exercising the option given
it by the court, consented to increase to the sum
of $339.15. The theory of the attack upon n~
dicts claimed to be excessive or inadequate IS
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that they arc not supported by evidence. r~he
rrmc•h· is a new trial. The practice of refusing
a new 'trial if the owrwr of the verdict will ren1it
the reeo\Tl'\' to an amount which the e\·idence,
in the jud~~nent of the trial court, will suppor~,
is ott<' of loug standing. In cases where the cndemT afl'ords a standard or rule for calculating
the sum which should be awarded, the practice,
whether the verdict is excessive or is inadequate,
is open to no objection. \Yhere the award depends upon conflicting testi1nony, and especiaJly
where the allowance to be made rests, of necessity, in the sound judgment of the jur~·. this
asserted and achnitted power of the courts is
sparingly exercised. In any case, the one in whose
favor the verdict is rendered is given the option
to rctnit or subtnit the issue to another jury. The
general rule is that. when a trial court determines that the datnages, awarded upon conflicting evidence. are inadequate. a new trial will be
granted. and that the court cannot render judgment for an amount greater than the verdict;
nor can a new trial be refused on condition that
the defendant pay a sum fixed by the court. 14
Ency. Pl & Pr 7t>5 ~ Lorf v. City of Detroit,
1 ~.> ~Iieh. :?H5, 108 N.\Y. 661. In condemnation
proceedings, the petitioner is not, as to the compensation to be awarded, a plaintiff. The court
was in error in refusing a new trial."
In the matter of State v. llan1n1erquist, 293 X ,,V. 539,
we han· a case of a default judgtnent being entered

:1gainst the party. thereafter, a guardian was appointed
pf the party and they petitioned that the judgment be
~rt aside. The court then took it upon himself to incrt·nsr the verdict and made an order that unless the
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State paid the an1ount within sixty days that the default
judgment would be set aside and the matter be tried.
At the end of sixty ( 60) days the payment had not
been made but the State sought an additional order
granting an additional thirty ( 30) days. From this
order an appeal was made. The court said on page 541,
righthand column, as follows:
"The order entered below operates to require
the defendants to accept a compensation fixed
by the court. This is an action involving a jury
question a court is without authority to increase
the verdict and thus substitute its finding for that
of the jury, has been settled by this court. W al·
ters Y. Gilham et ux., 52 S.D. 82, 216 N.W. 854.
Our conclusion that the learned trial court erred
in that respect in this proceeding might well rest
upon that holding and the constitutional safeguard of the trial by jury from which it springs.
Article VI, Section 6, Constitution of South
Dakota. However, our constitution further pro·
vides that 'Private property shall not be taken
for public use, or damaged, without just com·
pensation as determined by a jury.' Article VI,
Section 13. The plain command of this specific
limitation upon the exercise of the power of
e1ninent domain concludes the issue. Such is the
current of authority. In re Owen and Memorial
Parks in City of Detroit, 244 Mich. 377, 221
N.W. 279, 61 A.L.R. 190, 194, 18 Am. Jur.
1108."

In the case of Showalter v. State, 63 P2d 189, we have
an Arizona case where the amount of the jury verdict
was less than that testified to by plaintiff's own wit-
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Jl('~sc·s. The court said on page 190, righthand column,
as

follows:
.. ~l r . .rack \Villiams, whose business is house
moving, stated that he had been engaged in house
moving and changing the fronts of buildings
along \"an Buren Street and vicinity for quite
a while; that he had moved a number of buildings
back: that he was familiar with the cost of such
work~ that at the request of the highway department he had figured upon the cost of repairing
the store building and the service station on defendant's lots and placing them in as good condition as they were originally. He estimated the
total for such work to be $1,242.10, segregated
as follows: Removing and replacing everything
in connection with the gas station, $320.75; reconditioning the front of the story building,
$481.85; extending the back of the building, so
that it woulrl be its original length, $439.50. This
is the lowest estimate of the cost of repairing
nnrl reconrlitioning the store building and service
station and, when added to the value of the land
at $135, the lowest value placed thereon, would
be $1,377.10. Thus, according to the evidence
of plaintiff's own witnesses, the verdict was
$117.:!7 less than defendant should have recovered."

The court also said, on page 192, as follows:
''For the reason that the verdict and judgment
are insufficient under the evidence, and the error
in admitting evidence, the judgment of the lower
court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with
directions that the defendant be granted a new
trial."

17
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In the n1atter of the State Highway Commission ,.s.
Srste1n Investment Corporation, a Wyoming case decided .1\fay 3, 1961, found in 361 P2d 528, we have a
situation that is a little different insofar as the taking
is concerned. The Wyoming laws provide for the appointn1ent of cmnmissioners to make a return to the
court and then there is a petition to file to confirm
the report. The court, under the statute, had authority
to confirn1 the report or disaffirm it and appoint new
cmnmissioners if it deemed it proper. However, the
court in that instance, like the lower court, did in the
case before this court, took it upon itself to make its
own Findings and Decree, except in the 'Vyoming case
the increase was very substantial. This 'Vyoming case
carefully reYiewed the contention of the appellant, page
5;; 1, righthand column, as follows:
" ... They contend that the trial judge had
no power to personally increase or decrease the
a ''"ard of the com1nissioners. In other words, they
contend that the court in itself increasing the
award acted in excess of its jurisdiction ... "
.A.gain on page 532, lefthand column, we have:
"The textwriters and other writers seem to be
agreed that the trial judge has no power to increase or decrease the award of the con1missioners
except by express statutory authority. 1-\n anno·
tation on the subject is contained in 61 A.L.R.
194, where the writer states at P. 195:

'In the absence of clearly stated statutory
authoritY, the trial court does not haYe the
right g~nerall~~ to increase or decrease the
18
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amount of an award granted by comn1issioners
or a jury of viewers.'
"In .) Xichols, Eminent Domain, p. 72 (3d
ed.) the author says:

'Generallv. however, in the absence of ex-

pres-; statut~ry authority the trial court is with-

out power to increase or diminish the amount
of the award as determined by the jury or by
COllli111SSlOners .... '
"The author cites casrs from eleyen different
jurisdictions. It is stated in Jahr, Eminent Domain. p. 402 ( 1953) :

'In the absence of statutory authority, the
court has no power to modify an a ward contained in the report of the commissioners.
The court's power is generally limited to contirnlation or rejection ... '
"The saUl<"' rulr was laid down in 1\'lills, Eminent Domain, Art. 246 ( 2d ed.), as early as
1888. To the same effect is 18 Am. J ur., Eminent Domain, Art. 366 (1938). The cases cited
h,· these authorities we think sustain the statements made by them,. Apparently our statute
was taken from Missouri. In the case of Mississippi River Bridge Co. vs. Ring, 58 Mo. 491,
495, 496, it appears that the trial court attempted
to reduce the award made by the commissioners.
The court stated:
' ... I think the statute does not warrant
such a proceeding. The court may take evidence to reYiew the report, to see whether it
should be approYed~ or rejected and set aside
and new commissioners appointed. But I can
nowhere find that it was ever designed, that
19
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upon reviewing the case upon exceptions, the
court is authorized to make any alteration,
either by adding to or deducting from it ... "
The court went on further in a very exhaustive refer·
ence to different cases on page 533, lefthand column,
ref erring particularly to the New Mexico case of State
ex rei. 'y eltmer Y. Taylor, 42 Nl\1 405, 79 P2d 937.
That case cites 61 A.L.R. 194. On the same page,
many other cases are cited, including federal and state
cases, and on page 534, lefthand column, it states:
"If the party condemning the land should take
exceptions without demanding a jury, the landowner n1ight well prefer to have the jury pass
on the 1natter but would have no opportunity to
ask that. In short, we can find no sound reason
why '\Ye should not follow the great weight of
authority in holding that the trial judge has no
power to increase or decrease the award of the
commissioners. The judgment herein must, accordingly, be reversed."
Then again, in another '"yarning case, being Colo·
rado Interstate Gas Co. Y. Uintah Development Co.,
364 P2d 655, this being an eminent domain case, and
calling the court's attention to the left-hand column,
page 657, it states:
''Turning then to a considerato in of the power
of the court to 1nodify or change the award of
the appraisers, it is sufficient to say that we h~ve
yery recently dealt with this subject in an opi~wn
written by Chief .T ustice Blume in State H1gh·
way Commission YS. Syste1n Investment Corpo·
ration. lVyo., 361 P2d 528, 534-535. In that
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opinion .T us tier Blun1e pointed out that textwriters and other writers seem to be agreed that
the trial .i udge has no power to increase or decrease the a ward of the appraisers except hy
express statutory authority. It is not necessary
to review the authorities cited by the learned
Chief .f ustice on that point."
It is the contention of the writer that it makes no differ-

whether it's a commission that determines the
amount of the value of the land taken and the resulting
damngrs or whether it's a jury so determining, a court
~till rannot modify or change the same. On this same
suhjt•ct, State vs. Taylor, 79 P2d 937, on page 940,
right-hand column, it states;

rmT

"There is no specific authority in the statute
which authorizes the court, in passing on such
exceptions, to substitute its judgment on the
question of dan1ages for that of the commissioners: and in the absence of specific authority, the
court's power is lin1ited to either confirming the
report or ordering a second appraisement. That
provision of the statute seems to have been
adopted frmn Missouri and in passing upon the
same question, the Supreme Court of Missouri
in l\Iississippi River Bridge Co~ vs. Ring, 58
was lin1ited to confirming the report, or ordering
~Io. -t.!ll. held that the authority of the court
a reappraisement. See annotation 61 A.L.R. 194,
where the cases are collected."
l find in the case of State Highway Commission vs.
, Bloom, a South Dakota case found in 93 N.W. 2d 572,
nnd pnrticularly on page 581, the following:
"l~ nder the provision of the South Dakota
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Constitution which guarantees a trial by jury
in all actions at law it is for the jury to deternline the damages to be assessed. Art. YI, Section 6, Constitution of South Dakota. And as
to a condemnation proceeding, Art. YI, Section
13, of the Constitution specifically provides that:
'Private property shall not be taken for public
use, or damages, without just compensation as
determined by a jury ... ' So in an action involving a jury question a court may not substitute its findings for that of the jury by increasing the verdict. \V alters Y. Gilham, 52 SD
82, 216 N.\V. 854. Nor can a court in a condemnation action increase an inadequate award made
by the jury. State v. Hammerquist, 67 S.D.
"117, 293 N.\V. 539. But the province of a jury
is not invaded when a court in the exercise of
its judicial power determines as a matter of law
that a Yerdict or an award is not sustained by the
evidence or is against the law."
Linzell vs. Ohio National Bank, 137 N.E. 2d 520, is
a highway condemnation proceeding, and on page 522,
starting at the left-hand column, we have:
"The remaining assignments all relate to the
adequacy of the verdict. An examination of the
record on this subject reveals that the jury
awarded the sum of $5,125.00 as compensation
for the two buildings which were to be taken.
The record discloses that five witnesses testified,
all of whom appeared as experts, and placed the
following valuations on the buildings: (I) ~Ir.
Daley, $14,600; (2) :\Ir. Lowman, $14,000;
(3) l\1r. French, $10,700; (4) ~Ir. 'Veiler, $10!·
000; and (5) 1\Ir. Royer, $12,000. It therefore
appears that the Yerdict was $4,875 less than the
lowest expert opinion, and $9,475 less than that
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of the highest. The finding was in con1pletc disrt:>gnrd of the eYidenee, and nothing appears
further in th<' rceord concernnig the value of
these buildings. Tlw vnluation fixed by the jury
falls far helo\v any rational appraisal of estimated clmnages f'our~d in the ~ecord. Inadequacy
of' damages appears to be a ground on which
new trial may be granted.

"ln Toledo Railways & Light Co.

Y. ~Iason,

81 Ohio St. ~63. 91 N.E. 292, 28 L.R.A., N.S.,
I :w.

the syllabus provides:

'1. In

:111

action to recover damages for per-

·"ntwl injuries. a new trial may be granted on the

ground of the inadequacy of the damages found
hy the jury. when it appears upon the facts
proved that the jury must have omitted to take
into consideration smne of the elements of damage properly involved in the plaintiff's claim.
':!. On error in the circuit court to the overruling of a 1notion for a new trial on the ground
nf the inadequacy of the damages found by the
jury for an action for personal injuries, the cir~uit court may reverse the judgment of the court
') f common pleas and grant a new trial, on the
gi'otmd that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence.'

.. (•>) The rule in Ohio 'vith reference to the
inadequacy of verdict see1ns to be well epitomized in 1:3 Ohio .T uris prudence, 306, Section
l!H, to wit:
·, \ study of the results reached in the reported
eases seen1s to justify the statement that the
l'ourts generally grant relief if convinced that
the \Trd id ~ubstantially exceeds or falls below
anr rational appraisal ·or estimate of the danl-
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ages, even thought the inference of passion,
prejudice, partiality or improper motive on the
part of the jury is no 1nore natural or reasonable than the inference of mistake or misapprehension on their part.'
" ( 6) Counsel for the appellee urged that in
considering this assignment of error the court
should look only to the total verdict which was
for the sum of $68,875. However, in arriving at
this verdict the jury failed to place a proE_er
valuation on the two buildings. Section 5519.03
of the Revjsed Code requires that the jury make
a separate finding of the value of the buildings.
The Legislature must have enacted this require·
1nent for the sale purpose of testing the general
verdict, and if this valuation is against the manifest weight of the evidence then the general
verdict has also the same deficiency. \ V e, there·
fore, conclude that the verdict is against the
n1anifest weight of the evidence; the judgment
is reversed and th cause is re1nanded for further
proceedings according to law."

This case is cited in detail for the reason that counsel
for the plaintiff urged to the lower court that the court
should look only to the total verdict and disregard the
fact that the severance is lower than that testified to
by any witness. Counsel urged this, even though the
statutes require they separately determine the severance
damages.
In re 'Vest "\Vaite St., Seattle 155 P 165, we
have an action in eminent domain. It appears from
reading the case that the court furnished the jury a
printed fonn of verdict. A judgment was entered and
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amount paid ..Approximately one year after the verdict
tht-y ,J isL'( 1vcrcd an error in the verdict. A petition was
filed alleging the verdict was in error by inadvertance
nncl mistak<' and asked it be corrected. Upon presenta1ion of the petition the court granted the same ex parte
nnd modified the adverse judgn1ent as requested. The
adnTst· parties, upon discovering the order and modifil'ntion moved to set it aside, but on a hearing it was
drnied and the matter was appealed. On page 166, lefthand column, we have:
"On the 1nerits of the controversy we are clear
that the court was in error. The fact that the
verdict does not conform to the evidence, or is
rendered through mistake and inadvertence, is a
cause for setting aside the verdict, or, if not disco,·ered until after judgn1ent is entered, is a
cause for setting aside both the verdict and
judgn1ent, but it does not give the court power
to correct the verdict. The verdict is the jury's,
not the court's, and the court's power in such
cases is limited to seeing that the jury return
a verdict correct in form and substance. It may
not. after the verdict has been returned and the
jm·y discharged, change it, over the objection of
either of the parties, in matter of substance."

l n the Houston Lighting and Power Company vs.
Adams. 309 S,\.. 2d 537, this was a case in eminent
domain. It appears fron1 reading the case that the jury
became hopelessly mixed up and entered some verdicts
that were incorrect. The court then took it upon itself
1 to correct the verdicts by remittitur and we find on page
~ .143, the following:
l

25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'''Ve think in the case here that we not only
haYe the question of excessiveness, but we have
the question of the right of the trial judge to
substitute his finding for that of the jury, which
is contrary to our judicial history, where testimony of probative force is tendered on the issue.
His duty is to grant a new trial. \V e do not think
our views are in conflict with World Oil Co. rs.
Hicks, 129 Tex. Civ. App., 75 S.W. 2d 905.
See also Dallais Ry. & Tern1inal Co. vs. Farnsworth, 148 Tex. 584, 227 S.,V. 2d 1017."

This Texas case is cited for the reason that it was very
plain in the Texas case that an error through misunder·
standing on the part of the jury had been made and the
court decided to take it upon itself to correct that error
and substitute its opinion. This is exactly what the court
has done in our case. The jury's figures are below the
n1inimu1n testified to by any witness. The court has taken
it upon itself, by the theory of additur, to add sufficient
amounts of money to the verdicts to bring them up to
the minimu1n testi1nony. This is not a jury verdict but
rather the court's verdict that has been substituted by
the court attempting to usurp the power and function
of the jury. It is entirely wrong and contrary to any
principal of equity and justice and the statutes of the
State of Utah. It was an expedient solution by which
the court attempted to avoid hearing the cases over
again. If a jury refuses to follow the instructions and
the evidence and brings in a verdict which is outside of
the evidence entirely, then, a new trial should be grant·
ed. Briefs were presented to the court and there was
not one case presented in favor of the Porcupine Res·
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ervoir Company saying that in eminent domain proceedings where they take the property away from the
p<'ople by a statutory proceedings, that additur is
proper~ yet numerous citations were given from other
states where additur in such cases was not proper.
\\r <' belieYe the court erred and did not give this
th(' judicial determination it should have had. Our
court tries a great nun1her of cases in the First District,
nnd it is overloaded. Our judge has an ability to get
the decision t•endered and the case disposed of. Howt''·er, when mistakes like this are made they should be
t looked squarely in the face. When property is taken
~ nway from smneone against their will, speed an~ the
1~ necessity of completing the court calendar should have
no bearing. Everything possible should be done to
L prevent inequity and injustice.
i.

re

Qi

~

The case of 'Villiamson County v. Brock, 10 N.E.
It :!d 654, is another case where the jury disregarded the
~evidence and returned a verdict for less than any sum
~ testified to. The trial court failed to grant a motion for
W n new trial. The appellant court said in the righthand
, column of page 655, as follows:
i,.

rf

··c·nless the verdict of a jury, in a condemnation proceedings, appears to have been the result
nf passion or prejudice, or of a clear and palpable mistake. it will not be disturbed where the
amount fixed is within the range of the evidence
and the jury has viewed the premises. Forest
Preserve Dish'ict Y. Dearlove, 337 Ill.,}5.55, 169
X. E. 7.>:1. But where the jury disregards the
27
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testitnony and awards an atnount that is either
excessiYe or too small, as shown by the testimony
of the witnesses, we have not hesitated to set such
Yerdicts aside. Super-Power Co. Ys. Sommers,
352 Ill., 610, 186 N.E. 476. This verdict and
judgment for $15 for land taken were in total
disregard of the testin1ony. The court erred in
denying the motion of appellant for a new trial."
The case of Th1eyers Y. City of Daytona Beach, 30
S2d 35,J., is another example of where the jury disregards the evidence and returns a verdict for less than
the testitnony of any witness. On page 355, the right·
hand colun1n, we have:
"As to Parcel #15, the verdict was for $360
·whereas the lowest Yalue fixed by any witness
,yas $400. The award falls far short of full com·
pensation and must be reversed. The award must
be sustained by evidence. The jurors may riew
the property and use their judgment in evaluat·
ing the evidence, but, no matter how learned they
tnay be, they are not at liberty to disregard the
evidence."

POINT I'r
TIIAT IF ADDITUR \VERE PROPER,
THE COURT, BY ITS PROCEDURE AND AP·
PLICATION 1\CTED ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY A_ND \YITH UTTER DISRE·
GARD OF THE E'riDENCE AND SUCH AC·
TION ''TAS AND IS .A.NALGOUS TO A QUO·
TIENT VERDICT.
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\\"hen the court decided not to grant a new trial,
1t had rc·ct'ived l he memorandum of plaintiff ( R. 97tO:!). In this memoranrum and on the fifth page thereof
l'ounsrl for plain tift' said:
",\ lso it should be noted that the seYeran~e
damage ligure in the Keller case is only $664.00
lower than that of the lowest figure of an expert,
and in the A von case the severance damage
ligurc is only $158.00 lower than that of ~lr.
Palmer."
Thr court, without eYen checking these figures, said in
his mrmorandum of decision (R. 10-J.-105):
"The order n1a~· be that unless the plaintiff,
wit h[n ten dn~·s from today, consents that separate ,·erdic1s as to Keller and Avon may be increased h~· $664.00 and by $158.00 respectively,
the motion for n new trial 1nay be granted."

The plaintifl' inunediately had a consent to additur
~·prepared and signed by the plaintiff (R. 106), which
IM reads. in part, as follows:
"l'omes now the plaintiff above named and
consents to the increase of the verdict respecting
the Lloyd ,Y. 1\:eller Corporation to the extent
of ~t1li-LOO and consents to the increase in the
verdict in favor of the Avon Land and Livestock
Company to the extent of $158.00."
\m,·. if the court will check the testimony of Alden

.\dams (Ex. 43a and ~3b) relating to the Keller Cor:( poration. it can be seen that his opinion as to severance
~ rlamage was ~:1,88~.20. This was the lowest testimonv
1
v nf any witness relating to the Keller Corporation se~29
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erance dan1age. The testimony of Marcellus Palmc1
(Ex. 57) relating to the Keller seYcrance damage wa~
the next lowest testi1nony and was foT $1,855.~5 sever·
ance. The jury verdict for Keller damage was $3,200.00.
Hence we haYe the court's theory of additur:
$3,200.00
$+664.00

Jury's verdict
Additur

$3,864.00

Judge's verdict

Then to go one step further:
$3,884.20
-$3,864.00

Lowest testimony
Judge's verdict

$

Amount by which Judge's
verdict is under lowest
testimony.

20.20

The important point to be gained from this computation is not the mnount by which the judge's verdict was
below the lowest testimony, but rather, the obvious error
in the manner used to arrive at a fair value based on the
theory of additur. The value added was the figure used
in the plaintiff's memorandum. It was intended to bring
the verdict up to the lowest a1nount testified to by any
witness. The figure used was obviously an error made
by the counsel for the plaintiff and was carried into
effect by the court. If a fair and careful evaluation of
the evidence was 1nade h~- the court, then why was not
the error corrected? If the court was going to accept
the testimony of one witness oYer another in the one
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case it would seem more consistent to accept the san1e
witness's testimony in both cases. IIowever, this \vas
not done. In the A von Land and Livestock Company
rase, Alden Adan1s' testimony as to severance was
nearly $300.00 more than the testimony of either Barlow
or Palmer (Ex. ~:la, ~2b, :3~·. 34a, 3-t.b and 58) but the
increase allowed by the court was simply up to the low,..,, testimony given by any witness.
The situation may be reversed and the court could
hnrf accepted the testimony of Palmer and Barlow if
lw had recein'd a judicial impression as to the accurateness nf their testin1ony, in which event the theory of
:ulditur would ha,·e resulted in the following in the
Keller case:
(I) $4,855.20
3,200.00

$1,655.20

Palmer's severance (Ex. 57)
Jury's verdict
Proper additur

or,
~

(:?) $8.250.00

$3,200.00

Barlow's severance (Ex. 35a)
Jury's verdict

$5,050.00

Proper additur

rThe court did not exercise reasonable judgment or
~thrre would have been some consistency in whose testiJmony was to be followed.
,
X ow. isn't the reason why a quotient verdict is
frowned upon because it takes away the J. udmnent of

I

•

o
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the jury and reduces it to a 1nere mechanical operation
That is, add all the figures and divide the total by the
number testifying to arrive at your verdict. Doesn'l
it give the same kind of n1echanical result to say thal
I will take the lo,vest figure without regard to who, 01
how many, different parties 1night haYe to be con·
sidered to get the lowest testimony ? This is, in the
opinion of the writer, arriving at a mechanical verdict
and is, in theory, si1nilar to a quotient verdict. Opinions
of experts can vary so greatly on the same subject
matter, for instance, see the schedule of testimony under
Point 1 I. page 7 of this brief, for the difference in
severance dan1age as testified to on the Summers'
property, behveen plaintiff's own witnesses, Alden
Adams and ~-:Iarcellus Palmer. One is $5,184.00 and
the other is $2,009.00; percentagewise a difference of
about 150lj'o. Yet, these are the two parties the court
wishes to take the lowest figures from on the severance
damage on its theory of additur.

POINTV
THAT THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT
REQUIRED DEFENDANTS TO 'y AIYE IX·
TEREST BEFORE GRANTING A POST·
PONE~fENT OF THE TRIAL DATE. (SAID
POSTPONEJ.VIENT OF TRIAL DATE \VAS
REQUESTED FOR THE REASON A KEY
'VITNESS 'VAS A STATE SENATOR AXD
'VOULD BE ATTENDING A SESSION OF
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'fHl~

FOR

LEGISL.\TURE AT THE

TI~IE

SET

TRI~\L).

Plaintifl' had received an order of the court granting it possession of the property and pursuant to said
poss('ssion had converted the same into a reservoir, exduding the defendants en I irely frmn the property.
rnder the> statutes of the State of TTtah and particul:arly Scdion 78-34-11, U.C.A., 1953, which reads as
follows:

"JJ,.heu right to damages deemed to .have acaueds-For the purpose of assessing cmnpensation and damages, the right thereto shall be
deemed to have accrued at the date of the service
of sun1mons and its actual value at that date shall
he the measure of compensation for all property
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages
to property not actually taken, but injuriously
affected, in all cases where such damages are
allowed. as provided in the next proceeding section. No improvements put upon the property
subsequent to the date of service of sununons
shall be included in the assessment of compensation or damages."
In checking 1 11 A.L.R. 1304, as to interest in
!eminent domain proceedings, these cases seem to hold
;that the interest is a part of the just compen.Yation guar:mteerl by the C' onstitutions of the various states, which
prohibits the taking of priYate property for public use
·without just cmnpensation. In this particular case the
court said (R. 233) :
.'· . . . ~n the other hand, the court has toyed
w1th the 1dea. )lr. Skeen, that if you wanted to
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try the condemnation case first, the court had
in mind, was toying with the idea of making a
conditional order permitting a continuance providing they waive the accrual of interest beyond
that date."
Again (R. 234) we have:
"THE COL~R T: \V ell, now, what do you
say, 1\ir. Mann? You'll get a continuance in
your condemnation case. We'll lift out of the
partition suit that part that's under the water
and appoint referees to try and go out and see
if they can divide what's left. If they can't, then
the court will, under the statute, order a sale of
what's left for cash.
MR. Sl{EEN: If the court please, I wonder
if we could confer for five minutes with our
clients. I'd like to.
THE COURT: \Vhat I've said, gentlemen,
you'll understand is subject to modification. I'm
merely trying to get over this situation. All right.
Now, if you -want to insist on the condemnation
r will ask them to waive the interest. If you in·
sist on the partition, then I propose to lift out
of the partition suit that which is under condem·
nation. \Y e'll take a ten minute recess."
Again, ( R. 239-240) we have:
''THE COURT: Now I will rule on the evi·
dence, assu1ning that I'm still in the case as of
that ti1ne, based on what authorities you dig ou~.
So what do we do now? \Ve continue the parb·
tion case, suspend~IR.

SKEEN: Suspend the interest.
34
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)IR. )IAXN: Let's have an understanding
on the interest. The interest will be suspended
and let's get it in the record, frmn March fifth
to ~lay first.
Till~~ l'OlTR'f: That's all right.
~IR.

SKEEN: Yes.
~IR. Jl, \.N N: llecause that's the only differcmT that you can be out anything."
~ow. the titne involved is a short period and the

amount 111' interest is a small amount, but I ask this
•1urstion: \\'hy should the court take away just co·mJlfllsttlion from a property owner who is having his land
takt'll away frmu hin1 against his will, in favor of the
party who is seeking to take the property and has been
in actual possession of the Saine and is using it as his
nwn. and hasn't paid a thing for it? The defendants
arc only seeking a few weeks' continuance from the
trial date so as to have the services of an expert at the
trial. The expert is a State Senator and the Senate is
and will be in session at the time set for the trial. All
counsel was doing was asking that the matter be continued until the session was over and the Senator would
then be available to give his testimony. It takes many
weeks for an expert to accumulate his data. It takes
many ,·iews of the premises. The expense to the litigant
for the services of an expert witness can run into $100.00
per da)·· The interest involved for the period of time
in question would not equal the expense the defendants
woulrl he out. if they had abandoned the services of
the expert who was prepared and ready to testify. But
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to seek another expert and escort him through and orer
the project and get him ready for the trial setting would
be next to impossible. 'Ve believe that when justice
demands a continuance, the court should not take awa~·
Just compensation from the defendants involved and
actually give it to the plaintiff. 'Ve think the court
erred.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in failing to grant defendants'
motion for a new trial. There is absolutely no power
vested, or authority granted, either statutory or other·
wise, whereby the court has the right to apply the theory
of additur in an e1ninent domain proceedings. The
Constitution of the State of Utah gives the defendants
a right to a trial by jury. The defendants exercised this
right, and the jury com1nitted error. Therefore, de·
fendants are entitled to a new trial with a new jury.
'Vhen these errors are combined with the requir.ements
by the court that all three cases be tried together and
that interest be waived under the circumstances set
forth herein, all in the aggregate, resulted in a miscar·
riage of justice. 'Ve sincerely believe that all three
defendants are entitled to a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Walter G. Mann
Reed 'V. Hadfield
Attorneys for Appellant.
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